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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the conceptual relationship between two central 
elements of the theory of antitrust: competition and consumer welfare. These 
two notions are analysed in their mutual dependency. In terms of methodology, 
the paper proposes to structurally separate competition from consumer welfare. 
This technique is successfully applied in the domain of legal philosophy when the 
correlation between law and morality is debated. The main purpose of this paper 
is to show that both competition and consumer welfare are economic values of 
fundamental importance with no ex ante hierarchical dominance of consumer 
welfare over competition. In case of conflict, priority might be given to either of 
these values depending on the context of the assessment. This paper has a discursive 
character, it constitutes a response to Dawid Miąsik’s article entitled: ‘Controlled 
Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study of the Goals of Polish 
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Antitrust Law’ which was published in the ‘Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory 
Studies’ 2008 vol. 1. 
Classifications and key words: goals of competition law; deontological v. utilitarian 
antitrust; separability thesis; competition and liberal democracy; rule of form v. rule 
of reason. 
I. Introduction
In a thoughtful and persuasive paper on the role of consumer welfare in 
contemporary antitrust theory1, Miąsik provides an in-depth analysis of Polish 
legislative and adjudicative practices of defining the goal(s) of competition law 
and policy. Miąsik explores different approaches and methods presented in 
Polish antitrust doctrine, qualifying them in a clear and approachable manner. 
The conclusions of the paper suggests that “[P]olish [as well as all others – O A] 
competition law seems to be very consumer-oriented and generally follows the 
rule that ‘what is good for consumers, is good for competition”2. Miąsik also 
notes that competition “[i]s and should be protected because it is beneficial 
for consumers, the economy and therefore for the whole society”3. 
These statements correctly reflect the reality of antitrust. Normatively 
however, both of these assertions are contestable. It will be shown here that 
conceptually competition should sometimes be protected notwithstanding the 
interests of consumers and, on occasion, even at their expense. The discrepancy 
in the perception of competition requires a broader theoretical discussion 
on the essence and the role of competition in liberal democracy. Thus, the 
purpose of this paper is to compare different approaches to the notion of 
competition and consumer welfare, to undertake a structural separation of 
these phenomena and, to provide some conceptual benchmarks for their 
comparison. 
The central issue which needs to be properly articulated here is whether 
competition encompasses its own societal value4 or, whether it is merely an 
1 D. Miąsik, “Controlled Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study of the 
Goals of Polish Antitrust Law” (2008) 1(1) YARS. 
2 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 56. 
3 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 36. 
4 F. A. von Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”, [in:] F. A. von Hayek, New 
studies in philosophy, politics, economics, and the history of ideas, Taylor & Francis, 1978: 
“[C]ompetition is valuable only because, and so far as, its results are unpredictable and on the 
whole different from those which anyone has, or could have, deliberately aimed at”.
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instrument of achieving other, more “tangible”, economic objectives5. In fact, 
the methodological task of this paper is to undertake a transposition, into the 
realm of antitrust, of the classical dilemma between rules and interests contained 
in political and legal theory6. Depending on the ideological approach adopted, 
economic interests can be seen in terms of consumer welfare, efficiency, total 
welfare, industrial growth, innovation or any other tangible economic results. 
All these benchmarks have one thing in common – they consider competition 
solely as a means to an end, rather than an end in its own right. The end of 
antitrust policy is found, instead, in its substantial economic outcomes.
Theories which consider competition to be merely an instrument of 
achieving external goals (more important/the only valuable societal goals) 
can be classified as utilitarian7 antitrust theories. Concepts that consider 
competition to be more than merely a tool to increase productivity, generate 
welfare or maximise efficiency, are classified as deontological antitrust 
theorists8. The latter views perceive competition as a distinctive feature of 
liberal democracy that should be protected irrespective of the outcomes which 
it brings to society. This paper attempts to demonstrate that by emphasising 
the deontological elements of competition we make the entire discussion of 
the goals of competition law more coherent. The claim is not made here, 
however, that competition should be protected at any cost in all cases. The 
conflicts between different legitimate values are inevitable (competition and 
consumer welfare are only two of many such values) thus it is impossible for 
policymakers to fully avoid the necessity to make trade-offs. Nonetheless, the 
5 Ph. Lowe, “The design of competition policy institutions for the 21st century – the 
experience of the European Commission and DG Competition” (2008) 3 EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter: “In the Commission’s view, the ultimate objective of its intervention in the 
area of antitrust and merger control should be the promotion of consumer welfare”.
6 M. Weber, “Objectivity and Understanding in Economics” [in:] M. Weber, Methodology 
of the Social Sciences,New York 1977: “All serious reflection about the ultimate elements of 
meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories ‘end’ and ‘means’. 
We desire something concretely either ‘for its own sake’ or as a means of achieving something 
else which is more highly desired”.
7 The terminological distinction between utilitarianism, consequentialism, teleology and 
instrumentalism is irrelevant for the purpose of this paper. It does not analyse the differences 
between rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism neither. 
8 The deontological approach in legal theory is typical for the positivistic legal doctrines. 
In classical philosophy the deontological approach is related inter alia to the Kantian tradition. 
D. M. Hausman, M. S. McPherson, Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy, 
Cambridge University Press 2008: “Moral systems like the Ten Commandments are called 
‘deontological’… [D]eontological (non-consequentialist) ethical theories employ both agent-
centered prerogatives (they sometimes permit agents to act in a way that does not maximise 
the good) and agent-centred constraints (they sometimes prohibit agents from acting so as to 
maximise the good)”.
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compromises between different policies should have an ad hoc nature and 
depend on the particular circumstances of each case. They should not be 
based on an ex ante set hierarchy of values where the position of competition 
is lower than that of consumer welfare. 
II. Competition and liberal democracy 
As can be understood from the very etymology of the term, competition 
is a notion which encompasses a process, more than a result9. The notion of 
consumer welfare, on the other hand, is result-oriented. If we are interested 
in the outcomes that can be generated by competition only, then the very 
process of rivalry between undertakings would be seen as unnecessary or, at 
least, not indispensable. If, however, we consider that competition (seen as 
a process) is important for the societal paradigm of economic development, 
then the outcomes generated by this process are not the only reason for the 
rivalry between undertakings to exist. Methodologically, the latter approach 
appears to be more consistent with the idea of liberal democracy10.
Miąsik shows that the majority of Polish case-law considers competition 
as a means to increase welfare, while deontological elements of antitrust are 
present in some decisions11. His examples demonstrate that the Polish antitrust 
9 P. A. McNutt, “Taxonomy of Non-Market Economics for European Competition Policy 
– The Search for the True Competitive Price” (2003) 26(2) World Competition: “We argue that 
competition is a process, and as such can be described, rather than defined”.
10 D. J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe. Protecting Prometheus, 
Oxford 1998: “The genesis of the idea of protecting competition was imbedded in the idea of 
protecting freedom, and thus it is important to review… the role and substance of the concept 
of freedom… The institutions and traditions of liberalism not only scripted thinking about 
economic competition, but also carried its political fortunes”.
11 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 34: “In some cases..., statement can be found that the purpose of 
competition law is ‘to secure conditions for the development of competition” (Judgement 
of the Supreme Court of 24 May 2004, III SK 41/04 (2005)...)... This is followed by cases 
containing statements that the goal of competition law is to protect market competition seen 
as an “institutional phenomenon” which is the basis of free economy market (Decision of the 
President of UOKIK of 4 July 2008...). Other examples include declarations pursuant to which 
“[t]he good protected under the act is the existence of competition as the atmosphere in which 
economic activity is conducted” while the protection of consumers (as purchasers of goods 
and services offered under competition conditions) is executed “by the way” (Judgement of 
the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 November 2005, XVII Ama 97/04, 
published in: UOKiK Official Journal 2006, No. 1, item 16). Statements can even be found 
that “the task of competition authorities and antitrust law is to lead to a total (unlimited) and 
effective competition on the relevant market (Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 10 
Vol. 2009, 2(2)
DOES COMPETITION MATTER? AN ATTEMPT OF ANALYTICAL… 15
doctrine is not exclusively dominated by the consumer welfare ethos. Miąsik’s 
study reveals even more than “[t]hat the goals of Polish competition law have 
always been limited to enhancing efficiency and consumer welfare”12.
Competition is not only an important value in economics, it is also very much 
appreciated in the sphere of politics and culture. Inasmuch as the distinctive 
elements of competition are identical in its political, cultural and economic 
sense, we can draw a parallel between the economic side of competition and its 
political (elections) and cultural (freedom of speech) dimensions. In all of its three 
aspects, competition constitutes the essence of a liberal society13. The political 
aspect of competition is traditionally known as democracy (whereby elections are 
a competitory14 process, where political parties compete for the preference of 
the electorate). The cultural dimension of competition is commonly associated 
with pluralism (with the freedom of speech considered to be a competitory 
process, where different opinion-makers compete for the preference of citizens). 
The economic side of competition is reflected in the notion of markets (with 
the economic exchange of goods and services as a competitory process, where 
undertakings compete for the preference of consumers). 
In other words, electoral democracy is a competition of political programs; 
pluralism – a competition of cultural ideas; and the market – a competition 
of goods and services. We apprise free elections and free speech not because 
of their a priori effectiveness, but because the freedom to elect and to speak 
constitute the political and cultural essence of democracy. The same applies 
to its economic aspect as encompassed in the notion of free competition. 
October 2005, DOK-127/2005)”. All these decisions advocate deontological value of competition 
as an independent process. 
12 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 33.
13 J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement, Oxford 2002: “[There is a] 
tendency among competition specialists to treat their topic in a highly technical way, as distinct 
from the economic constitutional law of the Community. As the law now stands, however, the 
competition rules contained in the Treaty have a constitutional status and may be interpreted as 
shaping a law of economic liberty from restraints of competition and abuses of private economic 
power, not only a law of economic efficiency. Thus, an efficiency-oriented approach to the 
Community competition rules may not be in tune with the current normative structure”.
14 In my view it is more precise to use the term “competitor” rather than “competitive”. 
The scope of the latter term is much broader and apart from its antitrust sense (i.e. “involving 
rivalry”) it also encompasses the rather industrial meaning of “competitiveness” as “being of 
good enough value to be successful against other competitors”. The notion of “competitiveness” 
indicates the ability to compete. This ability can be achieved either by applying competition, 
protectionism or dirigisme. As we know, competition is not the exclusive way to achieve 
efficiency and industrial growth. The term “competitor” is oriented to the very process of 
competition. It is not interested in the final results of this process. For instance, the term 
“competitive market” can be interpreted as (i) a market which is strong enough to compete 
externally with other markets or as (ii) a market with strong internal competition. 
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If this presumption is correct, then competition deserves protection as 
a matter of principle and public choice, even in cases where it does not 
necessarily bring the best economic results. Competition in this constellation 
plays a pivotal role for the political, cultural and economic life of societies. It 
constitutes an important social value and represents a clear-cut public choice. 
In this sense, competition is not an indispensable way to generate welfare. It is 
rather a luxury product similar to most other rights and values. Often, from the 
utilitarian perspective, it might be seen as a redundant unnecessary practice 
with no, or minimal, positive effects. However, competition is protected not 
because it is the most efficient model for economic relations, but because this 
model is most compatible with freedom. 
III. Constitutionality of antitrust goals 
The first question addressed by Miąsik is the discrepancy between the goals 
of competition law and the legislative acts which contain them. The author 
correctly observes that most antitrust rules are designed in a very ambivalent 
form, which makes is possible to interpret them differently depending on 
the context15. This approach is confirmed by other distinguished authors16. 
In my view, the statutory ambiguity belongs to universal attributes of law17 
and legal interpretation18 as well as, more specifically, to constitutional legal 
15 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 34: “Without a doubt, competition law statutes around the world 
have one thing in common – their substantive rules are drafted in a language so general and 
imprecise that they resemble far more the provisions of constitutional law (Pointed out by the 
US Supreme Court as early as the judgment delivered in Appalachian Coals, Inc v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933)), that those of any other coherent body of law. Leaving 
any interpreter with one of the widest possible margins of discretion, this generality allows 
substantive provisions of antitrust law to remain unchanged for hundreds (US), a few dozen 
(EC) or several years (Poland) seeing as its rules may easily be adapted to changing economic, 
political and social circumstances and, of course, legal or economic concepts”.
16 C. D. Ehlermann, “Introduction” [in:] C. D. Ehlermann, L. L. Laudati (eds.), The 
Objectives of Competition Policy, European Competition Law Annual 1997, Oxford 1998: 
“Objectives are rarely defined expressly in competition statutes… They have to be inferred 
from legislative provisions which are broadly worded”.
17 In the Dworkinian sense, law itself is seen as a gapless interpretative process.
18 Unless perceived in terms of Barak’s “purposive interpretation” (see A. Barak, Purposive 
Interpretation in Law,Princeton and Oxford 2005: “Purposive interpretation is holistic. It views 
each text being interpreted as part of the legal system as a whole. Whoever interprets one text, 
interprets all texts. Each individual text is connected to the totality of texts in the legal system”), 
or Radbruch hermeneutic: G. Radbruch, “Legal Philosophy” [in:] The Legal Philosophies of 
Lask Radbruch and Dabin, Harvard University Press 1950: “The interpreter may understand 
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provisions. Following his presumption, Miąsik asks: “[h]ow is it possible that 
the same provision, the same semantic structure, is understood and applied in 
a substantially different way? How can it be that the same conduct was first 
perceived as anti-competitive, then as pro-competitive and it is now, in turn, 
viewed with caution?”19. He explains this situation by distinguishing between 
the goals of competition law and the statutory provisions that authorise 
or prohibit some legally significant actions. Miąsik states that the goals of 
competition law are not often defined and contained in its statutory acts but 
rather, that they are considered to be doctrinal, conceptual premises of the 
regulatory and judiciary authorities. 
According to Miąsik, the theories concerning the role and place of the goals 
of competition law are defined most precisely, extensively and authoritatively 
in the case law of the relevant courts: “[c]ase law determines which conduct 
restricts and which does not restrict competition as well as what circumstances 
are to be taken into account in a competition-related analysis”20. Indeed, 
Miąsik’s explanation appears to be satisfactory in respect to the importance 
of the judicial interpretation of legal provisions. However, in the continental 
legal tradition the judicial interpretation plays an important role only on 
the practical level. Conceptually, it is still overshadowed by the statutory 
provisions.. Indeed, judicial activism and judicial ‘lawmaking’ are becoming 
common and convenient practices also in many continental countries; however, 
their interpretation of statutory provisions still has an ad hoc nature and it 
does not change its ontological status. 
According to positivistic theories21, if a societal value has been explicitly 
embedded in a constitutional act, this value should be protected even in 
cases where judicial opinion deviates from the norm or states otherwise22. 
the law better than its creators understood it; the law may be wiser than its authors – indeed, 
it must be wiser than its authors”.
19 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 34.
20 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 35.
21 M. H. Kramer, In Defence of Legal Positivism, Oxford University Press 1999: “Though 
legality and morality are of course combinable, they are likewise disjoinable… What exactly is 
meant by the claim that law and morality are always separable? One thing clearly not meant 
is that law and morality are always separate. Separability does not entail separateness… 
[T]here can exist any number of contingent connections between legal requirements and moral 
requirements. A refusal to acknowledge the possibility of such connections would be at least 
as foolish and misguided as an insistence that they must actually obtain in all circumstances… 
[What this view] contends is not that legal requirements and moral requirements must diverge, 
but that legal requirements and moral requirements can diverge… Anyone seeking to gain 
a clear understanding of the relationships between law, justice and morality must attend to 
numerous distinctions within each of those phenomena”.
22 J. Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81(5) The Yale Law Journal: 
“The literal interpretation of judicial rhetoric is made possible only if one is prepared to join 
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The continental culture of legal interpretation does not unequivocally require 
complete coherency of judicial decisions either with one another, or even with 
statutory provisions. Each judicial decision that comes into effect is presumed 
to be legal – there is no requirement to cross-check newer decisions with 
their predecessors. Thus, constitutional norms can be interpreted and applied 
differently by different actors. This attribute of continental legal systems 
prevents situations where previous precedents play the role of lex specialis, 
because case law is undoubtedly placed below the hierarchical superiority of 
constitutional provisions. As a result, even under the presumption that case 
law contains some features of statutory provisions, it constitutes merely a “lex” 
inferiori23 to constitutional norms. Thus the generic constitutional provision 
that “competition should be protected” is neither specified nor concretised 
by judicial practice. It should only be applied by courts. 
From the continental, positivistic perspective, the consistency of legal 
interpretation with previous case law is merely strongly desirable, rather than 
absolutely indispensable. What is strictly required is the consistency with the 
hierarchy of statutory provisions. This would not be the case in common law 
jurisdictions, including to a large extent the EU case law culture. Therefore, 
I can only partly share Miąsik’s methodology of distinguishing between the 
goals of competition law and statutory provisions. I also have my reservation 
about the validity of Miąski’s view that “[i]t is the goals of competition law 
rather than its statutory provisions that determine which conduct is prohibited, 
which practice is allowed and how and when can a conduct find approval”24. 
Miąsik’s remedy, which shifts the attention from the “useless” provisions of 
the courts in endorsing two really harmful myths. One is the myth that there is a considerable 
body of specific moral values shared by the population of a large and modern country. The 
myth of the common morality has made much of the oppression of minorities possible. It 
also allows judges to support a partisan point of view while masquerading as the servant of a 
general consensus. The second myth is that the most general values provide sufficient ground 
for practical conclusions. This myth holds that, since we all have a general desire for prosperity, 
progress, culture, justice, and so on, we all want precisely the same things and support exactly 
the same ideals; and that all the differences between us result from disagreements of fact about 
the most efficient policies to secure the common goals. In fact, much disagreement about more 
specific goals and about less general values is genuine moral disagreement, which cannot be 
resolved by appeal to the most general value-formulations which we all endorse, for these bear 
different interpretations for different people”.
23 This would not be the case from a legal pluralism perspective, which tolerates wide 
discrepancies between the form and the idea of law. See e.g. V. Champeil-Desplats, “Legal 
Reasoning and Plurality of Values: Axio-Teleological Conflict of Norms” [in:] A. Soeteman 
(ed.), Pluralism and Law. Proceedings of the 20th IVR World Congress, Volume 4: Legal 
Reasoning, Amsterdam 2001: “The legal systems built on a percept of coherence badly adapt 
to the coexistence of norms prescribing contradictory conduits”.
24 D. Miąsik, ibid., p. 34.
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statutory norm to the more ‘fruitful’ and detailed provisions developed by 
case law, is logically consistent with the model in which case law is on the top 
of the legal hierarchy. This paper, however, advocates the opposite view. It 
assumes that statutory provisions are more than ‘abstract generality’ which 
ipso facto requires additional interpretation. Statutory provisions are rules and 
not guidelines. 
Statutory provisions should be correlated with the goals of competition 
law in form-essence or substance-idea categories. In other words, each statute 
contains more than is expected by a restrictive interpreter. Ontologically, 
each statutory provision is presented in its positive structure (form) and 
simultaneously contains its ideal dimension (“ideal” in its philosophical rather 
than poetic sense of the word)25. The relationship between antitrust goals and 
legislature are strongly correlated; they are mutually dependent and cannot 
be separated from each other. Thus, it is not the differences in goals which 
are responsible for “[d]ivergent applications of identical, or highly similar, 
rules contained in various legal systems”26, but the very nature of law which 
inevitably encompasses the productive tensions between the form and the 
essence of legal provisions. Taking a closer look at the correlation between the 
form and the essence of the law is thus necessary. In the domain of antitrust 
theory, this relation is particularly obvious in the conflict between per se rules 
and the rule of reason, which will be explored in the next section. 
IV. Rule of form v. rule of reason 
By applying a dialectical analysis27, we can observe that agreements which 
violate Article 81(1) EC, can be immunised from antitrust sanctions for two 
reasons: (i) because the agreement can have positive effects on competition 
25 F. Atria, On Law and Legal Reasoning, Oxford 2001: “D.1.3.29 (Paul, libri singulari ad 
legem Cinciam). Contra legem facit, qui id facit quod lex prohibet, in fraudem uero, qui saluis 
uerbis legis sententiam eius circumuenit (it is a contravention of the law if someone does what 
the law forbids, but fraudulently, in that he sticks to the words of the law but evades its sense). 
In other words, it is not possible to know whether by following a rule we are following the law 
unless we can ascertain theratio (sensus) legis”.
26 R. Whish, Competition Law, Oxford 2001, p. 16 (cited by Miąsik, ibid., p. 34).
27 Dialectics is a tool of analytical thinking, which accepts controversies within the norms, 
considering them as inevitable and productive forces of evolutionary development. In the 
area of antitrust dialectics inter alia means that different economic values (such as consumer 
welfare, economic efficiency, industrial growth, protection of competitory process, etc.) cannot 
be entirely consistent with one another, the trade-offs between them are then inevitable. Such 
inconsistencies are considered as the “fuel” for “an engine of freedom”.
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itself and, (ii) because the agreement can have positive effects on other 
important societal values, such as consumer welfare, innovation or industrial 
growth. It is therefore necessary to undertake an analytical separation of 
competition from consumer welfare. Competition and consumer welfare are 
two important societal values. Both of them are equally necessary for society. 
They, however, should not be seen as the synonyms.
Present day evaluation of the positive effects of anti-competitive agreements 
is based on the presumption that the agreement can be either pro- or anti-
competitive. However, this is not always the case. In some situations the 
same agreement can be simultaneously anti-competitive, pro-competitive 
as well as beneficial to consumers. In other cases, a given agreement can 
be simultaneously anti-competitive and pro-competitive but detrimental 
to consumers. Since competition constitutes an important societal value of 
liberal democracy, pro-competitive effects of anti-competitive agreements can 
sometimes outweigh the negative effects it has either on consumer welfare 
or competition. In other circumstances, the latter can be more important 
than the former. In both scenarios, this new additional test is necessary. This 
test can be performed by applying dialectics, which (i) separates competition 
from consumer welfare and, (ii) internalises pro-competitive elements of anti-
competitive agreements. 
Analytically, the conflict between rule of form and rule of reason is inevitable 
and generally productive. The relationship between those two notions has 
the same structure as the ancient philosophical dilemmas between form and 
essence, letter and spirit, norm and effect. Nowadays, it is encompassed in 
the terms of legal formalism and legal realism28. Antitrust doctrine strives to 
solve this conflict yet from the perspective of dialectical analysis, the conflict 
is irresolvable. The existence of the conflict has to be accepted. The tensions 
between the per se rule and the rule of reason should be seen in their dialectical 
28 B. Tamanaha, “The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists”, St. John’s University, 
Legal Studies Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 08-0130, April 2008: “Contemporary 
perspectives on judging are dominated by the story about the formalists and the realists. This 
chronicle has been repeated innumerable times. From the 1870s through the 1920s – the heyday 
of legal formalism-lawyers and judges saw law as autonomous, comprehensive, gapless, logically 
consistent, and determinate, and believed that judges engaged in pure mechanical deduction 
from this body of law to produce single correct outcomes. In the 1920s and 1930s, building 
upon the pioneering work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo, 
the legal realists exploded legal formalism, demonstrating that the law is filled with gaps and 
contradictions, that the law is indeterminate, that there are exceptions for most every legal 
rule or principle, and that legal principles can produce more than one outcome. The realists 
argued that judges decide outcomes in accordance with their personal views then construct 
legal decisions to rationalise or justify the desired outcome”.
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interplay. They are an engine for the evolutionary development of antitrust 
scholarship.
For example, according to the landmark Leegin29 decision: “The rule [of 
reason] distinguishes between restraints with anti-competitive effect that are 
harmful to the consumer and those with procompetitory effect that are in 
the consumer’s best interest”30. In this respect, the doctrine equalises anti-
competitive effects with harm to consumers. Respectively, pro-competitive 
effects are measured in terms of consumer benefit. The Court shows a clear 
example of holistic (i.e. either-yes-or-no approach) antitrust reasoning whereby 
an agreement can be either pro- or anti-competitive: “Vertical retail-price 
agreements have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending 
on the circumstances in which they were formed”31.
Although the per se rule is rejected mostly due to its administrative 
opportunism, the rule of reason also tends to base itself on the same 
methodological postulates – sacrificing analytical consistency for the sake of 
practical certainty. Following an alternative methodology of antitrust analysis, 
which is encompassed in the idea of dialectics, some agreements can be 
simultaneously pro- and anti-competitive. Thus, the balancing of the different 
effects of an agreement should not be seen in “either or” terms, as is currently 
the case32. Similarly, the fact that pro-competitive elements can outweigh an 
agreement’s anti-competitive ones should not be seen as the absorption of 
one by the others. The rule of reason concerns merely the immunisation from 
antitrust sanctions of otherwise anti-competitive conduct.
The Court states that “[t]he rule of reason is designed and used to eliminate 
anti-competitive transactions from the market”33. The origins and essence of 
the rule of reason are not in the elimination of anti-competitive transactions 
from the market. On the contrary, the origins lie in the immunisation of anti-
competitive transactions from antitrust sanctions, because the benefits of 
such transactions outweigh their negative impact on competition. It might be 
misleading to assume that the rule of reason impels pro-competitive agreements 
seeing as its purpose is to authorise anti-competitive agreements. The reason 
for such authorisation can be twofold. The conduct can be immunised because 
it brings better outcomes for consumers, industrial growth or innovation. 
29 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
30 Leegin, ibid. 
31 Leegin, ibid. 
32 Leegin, ibid.: “The rule of reason is designed and used to ascertain whether transactions 
are anticompetitive or precompetitive”; Leegin, ibid.: “While vertical agreements setting 
minimum resale prices can have procompetitive justifications, they may have anticompetitive 
effects in other cases”. 
33 Leegin, ibid.
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Similarly, though prima facie paradoxically, it can be immunised because its 
pro-competitive elements outweigh the anti-competitive ones, but not because 
the agreement “loses” its anti-competitive nature. 
The latter situation is possible after a conceptual separation of competition, 
as an independent economic value, from consumer welfare, another 
independent economic value. The two are equally important yet different 
realms. Acknowledging that each market action impacts the economy in many 
direct and indirect ways, we can see a so-called “butterfly-effect competition” 
where everything depends on everything else34. If so, then some market 
practices can be harmful to some relevant markets while beneficial to others. 
Hence, properly shown positive effects for competition on some markets, can 
justify the application of the rule of reason to agreements that have anti-
competitive effects on other markets. This justification is neither a blanket 
authorisation of restrictive conduct, nor a statement that this conduct is in 
fact pro-competitive, as it is currently the case. 
V. Methodology of separation
The political management of competition (its instrumentalisation in order 
to achieve ancillary economic benefits) is inevitable and desirable. It does not 
constitute however competition policy sensu stricto. Instead, it is set in the 
ambit of either consumer welfare policy, industrial policy or innovation policy. 
Competition, as an inevitable element of the market, has to be “unbundled” 
from other legitimate economic goals. The specificity of competition requires 
a separate analysis, which does not have to be subordinated solely to the 
utilitarian framework of consumer welfare, economic efficiency and other 
economic, political and societal goals35. Competition also has an inherent value 
34 J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy?, London 1976: “The opening 
up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organisational development from the craft 
shop and factory … illustrate[s] the same process of individual mutation … that incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is 
the essential fact about capitalism [O.A. – i.e. “about market”]”.
35 J. M. Buchanan, V. J. Vanberg, “The Market as a Creative Process” [in:] D. M. Hausman, 
The Philosophy of Economics, An Anthology, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press 
2008: “The market economy … neither maximises nor minimises anything. It simply allows 
participants to pursue that which they value, subject to the preferences and endowments of 
the others, and within the constraints of general “rules of the game” that allow, and provide 
incentives for individuals to try out new ways of doing things”. 
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as par in parem36. Such a description of the relationships between different 
goals and values facilitates the decision-making process seeing as it requires the 
regulator to prove the necessity to prioritise one goal over the others37 without 
going into their rhetorical subordination. In other words, the regulator does 
not have to invent a sophisticated theory of “what serves what” each time that 
its actions may diminish the interests of one policy or another. There simply 
is no “external”, independently defined objective against which the results of 
market processes can be evaluated. Each public regulatory authority shows 
an inherent tendency towards “economic optimisation”38. This temptation of 
policymakers often leads to over-regulation.
In fact, neither competition nor any other societal value can be prioritised 
in all cases. However, the deontological (or value-oriented) approach to 
competition does not seek to explain this lack of legal protection by diminishing 
the internal importance of competition. Quite the contrary, the fact that some 
societal values have been somewhat restricted, due to the priority given to 
other values, does not necessarily mean that the former are reduced in their 
ontological essence. 
Certain conduct of an undertaking can go against competition but in 
favour of consumer welfare. The opposite can also be true: a market practice 
beneficial to competition can be harmful to consumers. A practice does not 
necessarily need to be anti-competitive in order to be declared incompatible 
with other economic goals. The holistic (either-yes-or-no; either-good-or-bad) 
perception of policies with no mutual intersection and contradiction does not 
reflect reality. The negotiability of rights, and in particular the right to compete, 
relativises the notion of their absolute protection. No right can exist without 
its external correlation to another right. These rights are often in conflict with 
36 Compare this approach with the position of Richard Posner: R. A. Posner, Antitrust 
Law, The University of Chicago Press 2001: “Efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust, but 
competition a mediate goal that will often be close enough to the ultimate goal to allow the 
courts to look no further”. 
37 Ch. Kirchner, “Goals of Antitrust and Competition Law Revisited” [in:] D. Schmidtchen, 
M. Albert, S. Voigt (eds.), The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law, 
Tubingen, 2007: “[C]ompetition policy is competing with other policies which may pursue 
conflicting ends, e.g. agricultural policy, industrial policy, environmental policy…”.
38 The rationale behind this is quite simple. Imagine that on the South, on the North, 
on the West and on the East of country X four manufacturers produce orange juice. All 
ingredients of this product are equal, and the companies compete at the level of marketing 
rather than at the level of quality. The intuition of a dirigist regulator would be to “save” costs 
for the economy (i.e. transportation, aggressive advertisement, overproduction etc.) and to 
limit distribution of four identical products to the regions where they are produced. For the 
regulator this approach has many chimerical “advantages” and the idea of a free market with 
undistorted competition is therefore jeopardised by this regulatory temptation every time it 
fails to provide better outcomes.
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each other. A vivid example of the negotiability rights is a leniency program, 
which is essentially an agreement between a regulator and an infringer not to 
prosecute otherwise illegal behaviour if the infringer provides the regulator 
with important information. The idea of the non-negotiable nature of certain 
rights, such as human dignity, can exist only in an environment where all other 
rights are totally subordinate to it. The existence of two different absolute 
rights requires a compromise between them.
From the structural perspective, the conditions contained in Article 81(3) 
EC are not competition law sensu stricto. Rather, they constitute transitory 
guidelines on how to balance competition with innovation, economic efficiency 
and consumer welfare. They are a bridge between different policies, an 
algorithm for fine-tuning and balancing different interests and priorities within 
the EC; a compromise between competition and other legitimate goals, but not 
a competition policy as such. There are many elements of consumer welfare 
and economic efficiency in both rights, but the balance between them does not 
have to be based on the level of efficiency or other political goals. The alleged 
lack of mobility and economic productivity of the structure-based approach 
is related to industrial goals rather than to competition policy. If competition 
law was to be perceived through the perspective of efficiency, that would 
means that competition does not have an intrinsic value in and of itself but is 
seen only as a mean of increasing consumer welfare. If, however, competition 
law is understood as an independent societal value, like industrial policy is 
understood as another independent societal value, than it would indeed be 
necessary to establish a formula for their balancing. In such case, one can 
reasonably accept the deviation from competition rules in order to achieve 
industrial goals, but the rules as such will remain the same. In other words, the 
task of the public regulator is not to substitute the raison d’etre of one policy 
by another, but to conduct a permanent balancing act where trade-offs are 
made between them. This being said, a compromise between principles does 
not mean that one is replaced by another. 
VI. Conclusion 
Miąsik’s paper provides a very fruitful and methodologically harmonious 
analysis of the goals of competition law. The author not only expresses very 
original ideas related to the theory of antitrust, but also substantiates them by 
numerous relevant judicial decisions. While not fully agreeing with Miąsik’s 
theoretical positions and disagreeing with him on some technical questions, 
this paper widely supports Miąsik’s findings with perhaps the exception of 
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a few slight discrepancies which are likely to derive from the difference on 
the doctrinal backgrounds of the two papers. 
The notion of competition is inherently present in the economies of all 
liberal democracies. Indeed, there are many parallels between the economic 
concept of antitrust and the political notion of democracy. As soon as social 
values are being considered, it is no longer possible to perform a simple 
efficiency test. Human rights – the right to compete being one of them – have 
an absolute nature and cannot be compromised by mere efficiency criteria. The 
scope of rights is broader than the societal ability to protect them. Some rights 
are in conflict with each other and thus, there is often a need of reconciliation. 
Yet, at the conceptual level all rights remain absolute in their essence. The 
biggest political skill and the highest academic endeavour lies in the ability 
to find (or at least to articulate and define) the most appropriate solution 
in this perpetual practice of multi-compromises between different societal 
values and interests. Each society is characterised by a number of factors that 
distinguish it from their counterparts. Both are relying on competition as an 
invisible managerial hand which not only helps to articulate the most efficient 
political ideas and economic practices, but also prevents a monopolisation of 
economic and political power.
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